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Conflict Resolution in the Assignment of
Area Entitlements for Seabed Miningt
J.M. BROADUS*
PORTER HOAGLAND III**
This article describes conditions creating a need for, and the
procedures being implemented to achieve, resolution of conflicts
over deep seabed areas sought for exclusive exploration entitle-
ments. If and when deep seabed mining takes place, certain tangi-
ble advantages will accrue to nations or organizations that have
obtained entitlements to exclusivity of activity within areas of the
seabed. Development of legal assurances of exclusivity and secur-
ity of work within a claimed area has been proceeding along two
different tracks: (1) the 1982 Convention; and (2) a prospectively
complementary but currently separate and potentially competing
entitlement system based on domestic laws, multilateral arrange-
ments, and private agreements. Because the areas sought by pro-
spective seabed miners under both tracks overlap in varying de-
grees, attempts to resolve conflicts are a part of each track.
Successful resolution in either track could facilitate progress in
the other, and arrangements developed through efforts in the sepa-
rate tracks could contribute eventually to a convergence of the two
legal regulatory regimes.
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INTRODUCTION
If and when deep seabed mining occurs, whether under the legal
authority of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea'
(1982 Convention) or an alternative multilateral understanding, cer-
tain tangible advantages will accrue to nations or organizations that
have qualified as "pioneer investors" or "pre-enactment explorers"
and obtained entitlements to exclusivity of activity within seabed ar-
eas. A number of large international companies, as well as several
national governments, have invested altogether several hundred mil-
lion dollars during the last decade2 to develop the capability to find
and recover metal-rich manganese nodules3 that litter the ocean
floor. Until about 1980, investments were directed primarily toward
technological research and development and exploration. Virtually
all that spending has stopped, however and several major companies
have either withdrawn from the adventure or declined to make fur-
ther expenditures.4 Indeed, with few exceptions, the only major ac-
tivity within the seabed mining consortia appears to be securing legal
and regulatory advantages, and more specifically, acquiring assured
access to preferred prospective mining sites.
International law is shaped not only by agreement, treaty, docu-
ment, and decree, but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, by
State practice. Firm practice, whether by State-owned or private en-
terprises, affects international law as it is adopted, tolerated, or spe-
cifically rejected by governments. The principal practice now under-
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/
122 (1982) [Hereinafter cited as 1982 Convention].
2. See infra text accompanying notes 71-108.
3. Manganese nodules are found on the deep seabeds of the major oceans and on
the floors of other water bodies. Seabed areas of prime exploration interest are located
between the Clarion and Clipperton fracture zones in the northeast equatorial Pacific.
Managanese nodules recovered from these areas are typically composed of 25% mana-
ganese, 1.3% nickel, 1% copper, 0.2% cobalt, and many other elements. Haynes & Law,
Predicted Characteristics of Waste Materials from the Processing of Managanese Nod-
ules, IC 8904 BUREAU OF MINES INFORMATION CIRCULAR (1982).
4. International consensus on the legal regime established by the 1982 Convention
has been delayed primarily by objections from the United States and other industrial
nations to the seabed mining provisions of the treaty. Somewhat ironically, economic
prospects for seabed mining seem to be crumbling at the same time. See General Ac-
counting Office, Uncertainties Surround Future of U.S. Ocean Mining (1983); 33 BILu-
TON INTERNATIONAL NEWSLETTER 2 (1983); Farr, Metal Demand Forecasting and Deep
Sea Mining, PROC. OF OCEANOLOGY INT'L (1982); Vanney, L'Exploitation des Nodules
Polymetaliques: Une Convergence de Difficultes, 106 NOROIs 217-35 (1980); Deep Sea-
bed Mining: Where Do We Go From Here?, 182 ENGINEERING & MINING J. 123-33
(1981); FLIPSE, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A PIONEER DEEP OCEAN MINING VENTURE(1982); ANDREWS, FLIPSE, AND BROWN, THE ECONOMIC VIABILITY OF A FOuR-METAL
PIONEER DEEP OCEAN MINING VENTURE (1983). Some of the information in this article
is derived from an extensive series of in-depth interviews conducted by one of the authors
with responsible officials from all the commercial consortia and from most parent compa-
nies. Assurances of confidentiality necessary for these interviews precludes direct attribu-
tion to individual sources in some instances.
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way in the seabed mining arena is State and company maneuvering,
both within and outside the terms of the 1982 Convention, for access
to potential ocean mine sites. This article examines the framework
and status of those maneuvers in greater detail.
In general, this article analyzes the conditions creating a need for
the resolution of conflicts over areas of the deep seabed being sought
for exclusive exploration entitlements, and the procedures being im-
plemented to achieve that resolution. Because several prospective
seabed mining States have declined to accept the 1982 Convention,
two "tracks" toward establishing legal rules to govern seabed mining
have evolved. This article describes the two tracks, beginning with
the provisions for assignment of area entitlements under the 1982
Convention and moving to domestic laws and reciprocating States
arrangements that may complement the Convention track or evolve
into a "mini-treaty" alternative. The article also describes voluntary
private negotiations between seabed mining consortia," and provides
a detailed examination of the companies, State enterprises, and na-
tions that are major actors in the conflict resolution process. Finally,
this article discusses relationships between the two conflict resolution
tracks, concentrating on tendencies toward divergence or
convergence.
SEABED MINING REGULATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Conflict resolution, within the seabed mining context, refers to the
elimination of geographically overlapping claims of seabed areas. Le-
gal assurances of exclusivity and security to mine a claimed area
have developed along two different tracks: (1) the 1982 Convention;
and (2) a prospectively complementary but currently separate and
potentially competing entitlement system based on domestic laws,
multilateral arrangements for reciprocal recognition of entitlements
under those laws, and private agreements to facilitate reciprocation.
Because the areas sought by prospective seabed miners under both
tracks overlap in varying degrees, attempts to resolve conflicts are a
necessary part of each track.
5. Reference to Appendixes I and II may facilitate an understanding of the consor-
tia agreements.
1982 Convention Track
Part XI of the 1982 Convention applies to the "Area," or that
part of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.6 The
Area does not fall under any particular sovereignty. Therefore,
under the Convention, the resources of the Area belong to the world;
they are the "common heritage of mankind."17
The 1982 Convention creates an International Seabed Authority
(ISA) with the power to regulate the exploration of Area resources."
The "Enterprise", an arm of the ISA, may actually engage in seabed
mining, and transport, process, and market recovered minerals."
Companies or States that eventually mine the seabed under the 1982
Convention will be concerned with several important provisions, in-
cluding preparatory investment in pioneer activities (PIP),1° produc-
tion limitations," transfer of technology,1 2 financial payments,"' and
diligence requirements. 4 Of immediate importance will be staking
claims to seabed areas for exploration activities and, perhaps later,
for commercial exploitation. Because the most productive areas of
the seabed are limited, substantially overlapping exploration area
claims by seabed mining enterprises are not surprising. Conflict reso-
lution of overlapping seabed claims has been a sine qua non in the
allocation of seabed area claims through PIP.
Preparatory Investment in Pioneer Activities
Under the 1982 Convention, seabed miners, including the Enter-
prise, State parties, and State-sponsored consortia, must apply for a
"plan of work" from the ISA for activities in the Area. A plan of
work is a mining contract that confers upon a seabed miner "the
exclusive right to explore for and exploit the specified categories of
resources in the Area covered by the plan of work."1 Six months
after the 1982 Convention enters into force, the ISA will consider
proposed plans of work in the chronological order in which they have
been filed. A plan of work in compliance with the 1982 Convention
6. 1982 Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1, para. 1.
7. Id. art. 136-37.
8. Id. art. 156-58.
9. Id. art. 170, para. 1. The Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) will prepare
draft rules, regulations, and procedures necessary for the ISA to commence operations.
In addition, PrepCom will facilitate the early entry into seabed mining and assure the
effective operation of the Enterprise. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
Final Act. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62123, Annex I, Resolution I, para. 5 (q), 8 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Final Act].
10. Final Act, supra note 9, Annex I, Resolution II.
11. 1982 Convention, supra note 1, art. 151.
12. Id. art. 144 and Annex III, art. 5.
13. Id. Annex III, art. 13.
14. Id. art. 151, para. 2(b), (c) and Annex III, art. 13.
15, Id. Annex III, art. 3, para 1, para. 4(c).
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and ISA regulations must be approved, unless an overlap occurs be-
tween two or more exploration and exploitation areas. The ISA may
not accept a proposed plan of work that overlaps a previously ap-
proved plan."" A prospective seabed miner may submit a plan of
work that covers only exploration or both exploration and exploita-
tion.17 A miner with an approved plan covering exploration only and
a satisfactory performance record, has "a preference and a priority
among applicants for a plan of work covering exploitation of the
same area and resources."18
The 1982 Convention encourages prospecting activities in the
Area since the .Convention may not enter into force for several
years.19 Several potential seabed miners already have made substan-
tial investments in seabed mining.20 The Convention recognizes the
value of these early prospecting efforts through "PIP", a plan to pro-
tect preparatory investment in pioneer activities.2 For investment
protection, the Convention grants exclusive rights to "pioneer inves-
tors" to undertake "pioneer activities" within applied-for "pioneer
areas." 22 Pioneer investors are defined as State enterprises or mining
consortia that by 1983 have spent at least $30 million, with 10 per-
cent going toward the location, survey, and evaluation of a mining
area.2 3 Pioneer activities are a type of advanced prospecting that in-
16. Id. Annex III, art. 6, para. 3(a). Nor may a proposed plan of work that over-
laps a previously submitted plan not yet acted upon be approved.
17. See id. Annex III, art. 3, para. 4(c).
18. Id. Annex III, art. 10.
19. Id. Annex III, art. 2, para. 1(a). The Convention needs 60 State ratifications to
enter into force.
20. See supra note 2.
21. Final Act, supra note 9, Annex I, Resolution II. PIP has been called a "grand-
father provision" since it recognizes activities that have taken place prior to the Conven-
tion's effectiveness. See infra notes 71-97 and accompanying text.
22. Final Act, supra note 9, Annex I, Resolution II.
23. Id. Annex I, Resolution II, para. l(a). Basically, PIP names States, such as
France, India, Japan, the Soviet Union, and developing States that meet certain qualifi-
cations, as pioneer investors. PIP also specifies criteria by which other entities that have
the nationality of the above States or of Belgium, Canada, West Germany, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, or the United States qualify as pioneer investors.
Seabed mining consortia cannot become parties to the 1982 Convention. The consortia
must be certified as pioneer investors by State signatories. A certifying State may apply
for a pioneer area on behalf of a multinational consortium if at least one company is a
national of that State, even if other companies in the consortium are nationals of non-
signatory States. Id. The Soviet Union contested this provision before the United Nations
Legal Counsel, claiming the provision was prejudicial to Soviet interests. The government
argued that its national seabed mining enterprise could be certified only if the Soviet
Union signed the Convention, whereas United States-based consortia could be certified
without the United States' signature. The legal counsel found the provision was "politi-
cal," not "legal," so that conference participants could decide whether to keep the provi-
volves exploration.
Each pioneer area registered with the Prepatory Commission
(PrepCom) 2 4 under PIP must be large enough for two mining opera-
tions. The PrepCom eventually will allocate half of the mining area
to the pioneer investor and the other half will be reserved for either
the Enterprise or a developing State.25 Six months after the 1982
Convention becomes effective, a pioneer investor must apply to the
ISA with a plan of work for its pioneer area. The ISA must approve
a plan that complies with the Convention and ISA regulations, and
in the case of multinational consortia, that is submitted by parent-
States that are all parties to the Convention. 6
A "start-up" problem exists under PIP with overlaps among pio-
neer areas. Pioneer areas that PrepCom assigns to pioneer investors
have priority over all subsequent applications.2 7 Since most pioneer
investors will be designated as such at the same time, no chronologi-
cal basis exists for determining application priorities for pioneer ar-
eas, or for subsequent exploration and exploitation areas under a
plan of work. PIP specifically requires a certifying State to resolve
those area overlaps that occur between its nationals before register-
ing pioneer areas with PrepCom. PIP is nonspecific, however, as to
pioneer area overlaps between prospective certifying States, except
that those States "shall resolve their conflicts . ..by negotiations
within a reasonable period."28 If conflicts are not resolved, "the pro-
spective certifying States shall arrange for the submission of all such
claims to binding arbitration ... "
If conflicts eventually reach binding arbitration, an arbitral tribu-
nal must consider the following "factors" in determining a priority
sion. Department of State, REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE ELEV-
ENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAw OF THE SEA 8 (Mar.
8 - Apr. 30, 1982).
24. See supra note 9.
25. Final Act, supra note 9, Annex I Resolution II, para. 3(a), (b).
26. Id. Annex I, Resolution II, para. 8(a), (c). To receive exclusive pioneer rights
to an area, a commercial group need have only one member from a signatory State. To
receive an approved plan of work after entry into force of the 1982 Convention, all mem-
bers of the group must be from States that are parties to the Convention. See also supra
note 23.
27. Id. Annex I, Resolution II, para. 9(a)
28. Id. Annex I, Resolution II, para. 5(c).
29. Id. PIP states that if conflicts between prospective certifying States have not
been resolved by March 1, 1983, those States shall arrange for the submission of claims
to binding arbitration by May 1, 1983, which arbitration must be completed by Decem-
ber 1, 1984. If good cause is shown, the arbitral tribunal can extend .the arbitration
period by one or more months. Prospective certifying States did not resolve conflicts by
the March deadline. Except for the Soviet Union and India, prospective certifying States
have argued that they cannot even register claims under PIP until PrepCom "begins to
function." Since PrepCom has not yet begun functioning, the deadlines are irrelevant.
The Soviet Union and India have resolved conflicts between themselves and have indi-
cated their desire to register claims immediately. See infra notes 143-144.
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among pioneer investor applicants: (1) "the continuity and extent of
past activities relevant to each area in conflict and to the application
area"; (2) the date on which the pioneer investor (or its predecessor
or parent organization) began activities at sea in the application
area; (3) the constant United States dollar cost of activities in the
overlapped area and in the application area; and (4) the date when
activities at sea were carried out and the quality of those activities. 30
Memorandum of Understanding to Facilitate PIP
PIP is silent about the form of conflict resolution between pioneer
investors before -the invocation of binding arbitration. To negotiate
international agreements regarding the method of resolving overlaps
within the PIP framework, Canada, as a prospective certifying State,
chaired discussions in 1982 and 1983 directed at drafting a Memo-
randum of Understanding (MOU) among certifying States.31 Partic-
ipation in the MOU effort initially included all seabed mining
States, but eventually was restricted to prospective certifying States
or pioneer investor States, thus excluding those that did not sign the
1982 Convention. 2 MOU drafts were nonspecific, proposing to re-
solve conflicts by the exchange of pioneer area coordinates, identifi-
cation of overlaps, and initiation of discussions. Once overlaps were
identified, amendments to original claims causing new overlaps
would not be allowed.33 Efforts to adopt the MOU evaporated in
1983 due to disagreements and nonparticipation by several key
States. The Soviet Union, for example, after early involvement in the
MOU process, declined to participate further.3 4 The resolution of pi-
30. Final act, supra note 9, Annex I, Resolution II, para. 5(d). This paragraph
also specifies that a list of relevant coordinates for a pioneer area claim must have been
deposited with the prospective certifying State by the date of adoption of the Final Act.
31. Memorandum of Understanding on the Settlement of Conflicting Claims with
Respect to Seabed Areas, Draft (March 31, 1983) [hereinafter referred to as Canadian
MOU.
32. States that were excluded are the United States, West Germany, the United
Kingdom, Belgium, and Italy.
33. Canadian MOU, supra note 31, art. 4. The draft MOU is tied to the PIP
resolution that "[tihe Parties, including all potential claimants, will seek to resolve their
conflicts by means of negotiations or other procedures of their choice in accordance with
paragraph 5 (c) of the Resolution Governing Preparatory Investment." Id. art. 5. Of
course, this also ties the MOU to PIP's problems with dates and deadlines. See supra
note 29.
34. See Canada, Letter to PrepCom (April 29, 1983) (LOS/PCN/15). The letter
describes the actions of prospective certifying States in resolving conflicts through multi-
lateral negotiations-the MOU process. In this context, and with specific reference to the
Soviet Union, the letter states that "Canada cannot accept the view that a certifying
State may satisfy the requirements of resolution II [PIP] by unilateral interpretations of
oneer area overlaps under the PIP regime may very well occur
through binding arbitration. Understandings similar to the Canadian
MOU may eventually be achieved under PIP as an alternative to
binding arbitration.
Reciprocating States or "Mini-Treaty" Track
Domestic Laws
Several States already have enacted domestic seabed mining
laws. 35 These laws provide an administrative mechanism for States
to issue exploration licenses and commercial recovery permits for op-
erations on the international seabed. 6 Most domestic seabed legisla-
tion contains a method for resolving geographical overlaps of seabed
mining claims for exploration areas. Through "reciprocating States
agreements," most legislation recognizes claims by States with simi-
lar seabed mining laws. The legislation prohibits the issuance of li-
censes for the exploration of claims that overlap claims of recipro-
cating States.37 This article will examine United States laws and
regulations because of the number of United States exploration li-
the legal significance of the actions of other certifying States" (emphasis added), thereby
implying that the Soviet Union was not participating in the MOU process. The Soviet
Union participated only initially in the MOU process.
In reference to a French letter to PrepCom that disagreed with the "Soviet approach"
to conflict resolution (see infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text), the Soviets ex-
plained that "certain participants" in the Canadian MOU process " . . . insistently ad-
vocated the setting of time-limits for the exchange of coordinates which were considera-
bly later than the time-limits established in resolution II-an arrangement which would
be to the advantage only of countries which have not signed the Convention. . . ." Soviet
Union, Letter to PrepCom (May 2, 1983) (LOS/PCN/17). Thus the Soviet Union ap-
parently understood that its participation in the MOU process might increase the credi-
bility of entities resolving conflicts outside of PIP and the 1982 Convention.
35. See e.g. United States: Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C.§ 1401 et seq. (Supp. V) (1981); Federal Republic of Germany: Act of Interim Regula-
tion of Deep Seabed Mining, 20 I.L.M. 393 (1981) as amended at 21 I.L.M. 832 (1982);
United Kingdom: Deep Sea Mining (Temporary Provisions) Act 1981, 20 I.L.M. 1219(1981); France: Law on the Exploration and Exploitation of Mineral Resources of the
Deep Seabed, 21 I.L.M. 808 (1982); Soviet Union: Edict on Provisional Measures to
Regulate Soviet Enterprises for the Exploration and Exploitation of Mineral Resources,
21 I.L.M. 551 (1982); Japan: Law on Interim Measures for Deep Seabed Mining, 22
I.L.M. 102 (1983).
36. The laws also provide for levies or taxes on recovered minerals; the establish-
ment of funds to store tax receipts, with the possibility that these funds could be directed
to an international seabed authority sometime in the future; environmental protection;
the maintenance of high seas freedoms; and enforcement. For comparisons among the
domestic seabed mining laws see generally Wilson, Mining the Deep Seabed: Domestic
Regulation, International Law and UNCLOS III, 18 TULSA L. J. 207-60 (1982); Au-
burn, National Deep Seabed Mining Regimes and Reciprocity, 4 OIL & GAS LAW AND
TAXATION REV. 125-35 (1982); Luoma, A Comparative Study of National Legislation
Concerning the Deep Sea Mining of Manganese Nodules, 14 J. OF MARIUME L. AND
COMMERcE 243-68 (1983); Brown, Deep-Sea Mining: The Consequences of Failure to
Agree at UNCLOS Ill, 7 NATURAL RESOURCES FORUM 55-70 (1983).
37. See infra notes 50-62 and accompanying text.
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cense applications filed (ten) and the nation's leadership in the recip-
rocating States process.
In 1980, the United States Congress found that
legislation is required to establish an interim legal regime under which tech-
nology can be developed and the exploration and recovery of the hard min-
eral resources of the deep seabed can take place until such time as a Law of
the Sea Treaty enters into force with respect to the United States.3 8
As a result, Congress enacted the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Re-
sources Act of 1980 (DSHMRA), which included the establishment
of an "interim program to regulate the exploration for and commer-
cial recovery of hard mineral resources of the deep seabed by United
States citizens" (emphasis added)., 9 Congress intended DSHMRA
to be transitional, pending the ratification of the 1982 Convention or
if such adoption is not forthcoming, the negotiation of a multilateral or
other treaty concerning the deep seabed, and the entering into force of such
treaty with respect to the United States.40
Under DSHMRA, United States citizens may not engage in ex-
ploration for hard mineral resources 41 without a license. The explo-
ration license gives a company the necessary "security of tenure" to
make substantial capital investments without the threat of claim-
jumping by other United States companies.42 Companies exploring
for hard minerals before the enactment of DSHMRA (pre-enact-
ment explorers) are permitted to continue exploration activities if
they apply for a license for a specific area.43 The status of "pre-
enactment explorer" gives a company a "priority of right" to explore
"reasonably compact areas" of the seabed that are "bounded by a
single continuous boundary.""
Priority of right for the issuance of licenses is based on the chrono-
logical order in which applications are filed with the National
38. 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16) (Supp. V) (1981).
39. Id. § 1401(b)(3).
40. 30 U.S.C. § 1441(3)(B) (Supp. V) (1981).
41. "Hard mineral resources" are "any deposit or accretion on, or just below, the
surface of the deep seabed of nodules which include one or more minerals, at least one of
which contains manganese, nickel, cobalt or copper." 30 U.S.C. 1403 (6)
42. 30 U.S.C. 1441(1)(B) (Supp. V) (1981).
43. Id. § 1411(b)(A). A United States citizen may continue exploration activities
unless and until an administrative or judicial determination affirms a denial of certifica-
tion or issuance of an exploration license. Id. § 1411(b)(B).
44. 30 U.S.C. 1413(b) and 15 C.F.R. 970.301(d), (e) (1982). When an application
area is amended through the conflict resolution process, "new" areas may be proposed
which "need not be adjacent to the area applied for in the original application," and
therefore the amended area might not be bounded by a continuous boundary. 15 C.F.R.
970.302(g)(3) (1982); see also infra note 48.
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce. Priority of right is maintained even if the
application is only in "substantial" compliance with specific require-
ments as long as the application fully complies within a reasonable
time.45 Under NOAA regulations, all pre-enactment explorer license
applications are deemed to have been filed at the same time .4 Four
multinational seabed mining consortia have filed pre-enactment ex-
ploration license applications with NOAA.'7
Congress intended chronological priorities of right to preclude ex-
ploration area overlaps. The concurrent entitlement of priorities of
right, however, requires a procedure to resolve conflicts between pre-
enactment explorers. In addition, once the "original" conflicts are
resolved, "new" conflicts may arise with amendments to the original
application areas.'8 Under NOAA regulations, conflict resolution in
the United States may take one of three basic forms: (1) each appli-
cant may voluntarily amend his application or agree with the other
applicants to voluntarily amend all applications; (2) all applicants
may voluntarily submit to an agreed binding conflict resolution pro-
cedure; or (3) failing either of these, the conflict must be resolved in
a formal hearing before an administrative law judge.'
Reciprocating States
Rights and restrictions of United States companies conferred by
DSHMRA are inapplicable outside the jurisdiction of the United
States. West Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, and the
Soviet Union have enacted their own domestic seabed mining laws.5
Overlaps, therefore, can occur not only between applicants that file
for exploration areas under the laws of one nation, but also between
applicants that file under the domestic seabed mining laws of differ-
ent nations.5 1
To prevent these overlaps, DSHMRA provides for reciprocal re-
quirements with other seabed mining States. 2 NOAA may desig-
45. 15 C.F.R. 970.201-08(1982).
46. 47 Fed. Reg. 11513 (1982).
47. The consortia are OMA, OMCO, KCON, and OMI. 47 Fed. Reg. 27583-84
(1982).
48. "New" exploration areas proposed by pre-enactment explorers need not be ad-jacent to the area applied for in the original application, but must have been an area that
the applicant has explored previous to enactment of DSHMRA and cannot be within an
area originally applied for by any other applicant. 15 C.F.R. 970.302(g) (1982).
49. 15 C.F.R. 970.1001 (1982). This section details the formal hearing procedures.
50. See supra note 35.
51. Every "original" exploration area applied for under United States law had at
least one conflict with another exploration area claim. L.J. Aurbach, Office of Ocean
Minerals and Energy, NOAA, personal communication (March 8, 1983).
52. 30 U.S.C. § 1428 (Supp. V) (1981). The domestic seabed mining laws of other
nations also provide for reciprocal arrangements. See supra note 35.
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nate any foreign nation a "reciprocating State" based on positive
findings by the State Department that certain requirements have
been met. A reciprocating State must: (1) regulate seabed miners in
a manner compatible with DSHMRA especially in environmental
protection, natural resource conservation, safety of life and property
at sea, and effective enforcement; (2) recognize licenses and permits
issued under United States law; (3) recognize priorities of right of
exploration licenses (or applications for licenses) and commercial re-
covery permits; and (4) provide "an interim legal framework for ex-
ploration and commercial recovery which does not unreasonably in-
terfere with the interests of other States in their exercise of the
freedoms of the high seas, as recognized under general principles of
international law."' 58 Once a foreign nation has been designated a
reciprocating State, NOAA cannot issue an exploration license or
commercial recovery permit that conflicts with a license, permit, or
other authorization issued by that State."
The critical issue still exists of how exploration area overlaps can
be resolved between applicants under different jurisdictions. As a
precursor to a more comprehensive reciprocating States agreement,
France, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States
have signed an "Agreement Concerning Interim Arrangenients Re-
lating to Polymetallic Nodules of the Deep Sea Bed"55 (Interim
Agreement). The agreement addresses the problem of overlapping
area claims and provides that each State-party must first resolve do-
mestic conflicts in accordance with its own domestic requirements. 6
If international conflicts still exist, signatory governments can assist
license applicants in resolving conflicts voluntarily. If conflicts have
not been resolved six months after the effective date of the Interim
Agreement and the applicants are not "parties to a written agree-
ment submitting the conflict to a specified binding conflict resolution
procedure," conflicts must be resolved through binding arbitration.5 7
53. 30 U.S.C. § 1428(a) (Supp. V) (1981). NOAA may consult with potential
reciprocating States that have enacted, or intend to enact, domestic seabed mining legis-
lation. The purpose of the consultation is to facilitate the designation of reciprocating
States and negotiate agreements with potential and actual reciprocating States. Id. §
1428(f). Potential reciprocating States are those that already have enacted domestic sea-
bed mining laws; Italy and Belgium, which have legislation under consideration and the
Netherlands. See General Accounting Office, supra note 4, at 24-27; Auburn, supra note
36, at 134 (The legislation of Italy and Belgium is in an "advanced stage of drafting").
54. 30 U.S.C. § 1428(b) (Supp. V) (1981).
55. 21 I.L.M. 950 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Interim Agreement].
56. Id. art. 7.
57. Id. app. 1. The commercial consortia are parties to a private industry arbitra-
"Principles of equity" used to determine the priority of claims in
binding arbitration under the Interim Agreement are virtually iden-
tical to the "factors" used in binding arbitration under PIP.58
Mini-Treaty
Nations generally have drafted domestic seabed mining legislation
that is interim and transitional in nature, pending the entry into
force of the 1982 Convention or other multilateral treaty. The
United States, however, has created a reciprocating process that can
change DSHMRA from an "interim" law into an "alternative"
law.59 Through a multilateral arrangement, or "mini-treaty," more
permanent than the Interim Agreement, DSHMRA presents an al-
ternative to the 1982 Convention, which United States seabed min-
ing firms and the Reagan Administration believe is unacceptably
burdensome.60
tion agreement that essentially precludes binding arbitration under the Interim Agree-
ment. See infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
58. Interim Agreement, supra note 55, app. 2; see supra note 30 and accompany-
ing text.
59. DSHMRA voices congressional intent that any international agreement con-
cerning seabed minerals to which the United States becomes a party must "provide as-
sured and nondiscriminatory access, under reasonable terms and conditions." 30 U.S.C. §
1441(l)(A) (Supp. V) (1981). Moreover, the agreement must provide "security of ten-
ure" to pre-enactment explorers such that they may "continue their operations under
terms, conditions, and restrictions which do not impose significant new economic burdens
... with the effect of preventing the continuation of such operations on a viable eco-
nomic basis." Id. § 1441(l)(B). This broad language is amenable to conservative inter-
pretation, such as that advocated by the Reagan Administration in deciding not to sign
the 1982 Convention. Wertenbaker, The Law of the Sea-I, 59 THE NEW YORKER 56,
67 (Aug. 8, 1983). Commentators have argued that production limitations, technology
transfer, and financial payments to the ISA fall within the ambit of significant new eco-
nomic burdens. Cf. Ratiner, Reciprocating State Arrangements: A Transition or an Al-
ternative? XVII ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA INST. (1983) (Oslo,
Norway). "While the Law of the Sea Treaty contains a number of features which can
reasonably be considered to be noxious by the standards of industrialized, free market
economies, it does not on balance harm the potential for enjoyment of the economic
benefits or exploitation of the resources." Id. at 15. A decision to use DSHMRA as an
alternative to the 1982 Convention discounts the relative stability of the Convention's
seabed regime, the opportunity for the United States to shape the administration of sea-
bed mining by participating in PrepCom, and other advantages that inhere with adoption
of the multifaceted 1982 Convention.
60. By choosing the mini-treaty rather than the 1982 Convention's seabed mining
regime, the United States makes several assumptions. First, the nation assumes that sea-
bed claims can be defended, using force if necessary, to ensure stability and thus security
of tenure. Auburn, supra note 36, at 134. Second, the United States assumes that
PrepCom cannot perform adequately without the participation of the United States or
"decision-taking" by other developed, prospective reciprocating States. (For a discussion
on the meaning of "decision-taking," see Mann-Borgese, The New International Seabed
Regime, 6 MARINE POLICY REPORTS (February 1984). Indeed, after two meetings of the
first session, PrepCom has yet to "begin to function" for the purposes of PIP. Personal
communication with David Pasho, Ocean Mining, Energy, Mines and Resources Canada,
Ottawa, Sept. 28, 1983. Third, the United States assumes that other facets of the 1982
Convention- limits to the territorial sea, contiguous zone, continental shelf, and exclu-
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No such mini-treaty yet exists, but its beginnings can be found in
the conflict resolution mechanism of the Interim Agreement. 1 Pre-
sumably, a mini-treaty would strive to harmonize the several domes-
tic seabed mining laws and provide necessary stability for security of
tenure, while avoiding any significant new economic burdens. A
mini-treaty would provide for: (1) the mutual recognition of (as well
as the resolution of overlaps between) exploration area claims; (2)
the mutual recognition of commercial recovery area claims; (3) envi-
ronmental protection; (4) natural resource conservation; (5) safety of
life and property at sea; and (6) effective enforcement.6 2 Finally, a
mini-treaty can be politically feasible in an international sense only
by disclaiming any derogation of obligations that a party may have
under another related agreement, such as any pre-ratification obliga-
tions of France, Japan, and the Netherlands under the 1982
Convention.
Industry Negotiations
Concern for conflict resolution is not limited to national govern-
ments. Six seabed mining consortia, which include private and public
companies from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom,
West Germany, Japan, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and France,
have signed an "Industry Arbitration Agreement" to resolve explora-
tion area overlaps.63 The agreement and associated negotiations are
sive economic zone; rights of innocent passage; navigation through straits; high seas free-
doms; marine environmental protection; marine scientific research; dispute settlement;
and others-are now customary international law. Codification of this law into a compre-
hensive treaty is merely a reaffirmation of its customary nature. Breaux, The Case
Against the Convention, XVII ANNUAL CONF. OF THE LAw OF THE SEA INST. (1983)
(Oslo, Norway). Fourth, the nation assumes that a substantial number of prospective
reciprocating States are interested in proceeding with a mini-treaty. The United States,
West Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy have
shown interest in participating in a "mini-treaty." The term "mini-treaty" is unattractive
to some prospective participants, such as Japan and the Netherlands, who do not wish to
create an impression that they are in conflict with their obligations as signatories to the
1982 Convention. See 1982 Convention, supra note 1, art. 137, para. 3.
61. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
62. 30 U.S.C. § 1428(a) (Supp. V) (1981).
63. The consortia involved in these private negotiations are OMA, OMCO,
KCON, OMI, AFERNOD, and DORD. These groups are described in detail, infra
notes 71-107. See e.g., letter from J.G. Arbuckle to J.P. Lawless, NOAA (Jan. 4, 1984).
The letter refers to an accomplished "Final Settlement Agreement" and transmits a copy
of a "Supplemendary Settlement Agreement." The latter agreement has been signed by
the six sealed mining consortia and AMR and resolves conflicts between the parties.
Supplementary Settlement Agreement (Dec. 5, 1983). [The Final and Supplementary
Settlement Agreements are hereinafter referred to jointly as Industry Arbitration
Agreement.]
subject to secrecy and have been kept extremely confidential. The
industry apparently has agreed to apportion, on a voluntary basis,
the areas identified so far as the most promising. If no voluntary
decision appears feasible, then binding arbitration can be invoked
under the agreement by any of the parties.6 4 The industry's agree-
ment reasonably can be assumed to parallel the conflict resolution
mechanisms under United States domestic law and the Interim
Agreement.6" Binding arbitration may already have been invoked,
but no one has publicly announced the resolution of overlaps. 6 Sev-
eral industry sources have indicated privately, however, that conflicts
have been resolved on the basis of "equal sharing. '67
In any event, the industry agreement alone cannot effect world-
wide conflict resolution since some State enterprises, most notably
from the Soviet Union, have not been involved.68 Nevertheless,
agreement within the industry would be an important preliminary
step toward conflict resolution under either the 1982 Convention or a
mini-treaty.
This type of voluntary agreement among competitors for the divi-
sion of prospective mining territory raises obvious concerns of poten-
tial antitrust problems. These concerns are raised particularly under
the familiar American interpretation of antitrust principles, which
tend to be less tolerant of combinations in restraint of competition
than European tradition. The extent to which these concerns are jus-
tified under United States law is beyond the scope and competence
of this study. On balance, the private conflict resolution arrange-
ments most likely will go unopposed by the government's antitrust
enforcement agencies, especially in light of a prior clearance of the
consortia license applications by the Justice Department. 69
64. Private communications with company officials, see supra note 4.
65. See supra notes 49 and 56-58 and accompanying text.
66. But see Citizens for Ocean Law, OCEANS POLICY NEWS (November 1983)
(noting that the Japanese have been brought into the private industry arbitration
negotiations).
67. Private communication with company officials, supra note 4.
68. Citizens for Ocean Law, supra note 66, at 2.
69. DSHMRA empowers the Attorney General to conduct an antitrust review of
seabed mining exploration licenses and to advise NOAA of likely competitive effects of
the issuance of those licenses. 30 U.S.C. § 1413(d) (Supp. V) (1981). The Act further
empowers the Attorney General to recommend ways to avoid any action upon an applica-
tion that would create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws. The
Department of Justice has, in fact, already reviewed the NOAA applications of OMI,
OMCO, OMA, and KCON. Letters dated Sept. 30, 1982 and Dec. 17, 1982 from H.F.
Furth, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division (ATD), U.S. Department
of Justice to J.P. Lawless, Acting Director, Office of Ocean Minerals and Energy,
NOAA (Washington: U.S. Department of Justice). In each case the Justice Department
concluded that the application "should not be denied for any reason arising from anti-
trust considerations." However, the letters also stated that the department's views were
based on "limited review" and were "subject to qualification with regard to any matters
or facts that a more extended review might disclose."
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COMPANIES, STATES, AND PARTIES IN INTEREST: ORGANIZATIONAL
RELATIONSHIPS AND MOTIVATIONS
Several actors are involved in the process of securing entitlements
to prospective seabed mining areas, either through the 1982 Conven-
tion or through complementary or competing mechanisms. The ac-
tors include: (1) seabed mining enterprises, such as (a) private com-
Although formal antitrust review under the Act is limited to review of the license
applications themselves, and does not specifically include review of private conflict resolu-
tion agreements, some indications exist that a private agreement conforming to the reso-
lution contemplated under the United States regulations has been reached and is being
reviewed by the Justice Department. This review could well be within the scope of anti-
trust review empowered by the Act, and could be initiated either by the Justice Depart-
ment or at NOAA's request as a "more extended review" to facilitate "any recommenda-
tion" the Attorney General "deems advisable to avoid any action upon" a NOAA
application that would create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws.
(Conceivably, the Justice Department's review of a private agreement could also be con-
ducted at the request of the parties to the agreement under the department's business
review procedures. But because such review is explicitly directed only to contemplated
actions, the review seems less likely to be invoked for an accomplished agreement.)
In this context, the Justice Department: (1) declined to comment on the conflict reso-
lution procedures described by NOAA regulations pursuant to DSHMRA; (2) received
from NOAA a copy of the private Industry Arbitration Agreement arrived at to imple-
ment private resolution of conflicting license area claims, and declined to object to that
arrangement; and (3) granted antitrust clearance to each of the exploration license appli-
cations, subject to the qualification already described. Therefore, since the Justice De-
partment was previously informed of, and did not object to, the fact and format of the
private conflict resolution arrangement, any review now would most likely be directed to
the outcome of that procedure rather than to the procedure itself.
Antitrust objections might be directed to anticompetitive effects of the private arrange-
ment on either the disposition and allocation of NOAA licenses or existing relevant mar-
kets. For example, an objection might be registered that the private resolution distorts
the allocation of NOAA licenses by foregoing market mechanisms otherwise available to
resolve the conflicts. See, e.g. Petition for Reconsideration of the United States Depart-
ment of Justice, In the matter of An Inquiry into the Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz
and 870-890 MHz for Cellular Communications Systems; Amendment of Parts 2 and 22
of the Commission's Rules Relative to Cellular Communications Systems, Before the
Federal Communications Commission, Docket No. 79-318 (June 19, 1981). NOAA reg-
ulations, however, stipulate that disputes can be voluntarily settled in a "variety of rele-
vant forms, including formation of a joint venture." 47 Fed.Reg. 5967 (1982). In any
event, this objection would seem to go to the fact and format for private resolution rather
than to the outcome itself. Concerns about effects on existing markets would depend on
the exact definition of appropriate markets for antitrust purposes. The private agree-
ments arguably represent an illegal market allocation and impose anticompetitive bur-
dens on potential new entrants into seabed mining. However, the agreements also argua-
bly facilitate the development of new sources of competition in existing metals markets.
In any event, parties to an agreement would feel some degree of protection from antitrust
attack to the extent that the private agreement conforms to the requirements of the fed-
eral regulatory authority.
Obviously, the antitrust issues associated with the private conflict resolution procedure
and agreements are not clearcut, particularly in the absence of more factual information
about the nature of those agreements. These issues, however, clearly do exist.
panies and commercial organizations, exemplified by the major
international seabed mining consortia, and (b) state enterprises,
which are organs of national governments directly investing in explo-
ration and development similar to consortia efforts; and (2) national
governments themselves, which conduct diplomatic activities and
have been the official participants in and parties to international ne-
gotiations and agreements.
Seabed Mining Enterprises
A striking feature of the embryonic seabed mining economy, and
perhaps most reflective of a general trend in international economic
organization, is the mixed-form character of the groups assembled to
develop and conduct the activity. Several of the world's largest and
most influential private companies are involved. Yet none of the sea-
bed mining enterprises is composed exclusively of privately-owned
companies. All have at least some participation by national govern-
ments or State companies, and some are largely or entirely govern-
mental operations.7"
Commercial Consortia
An early commercial pioneer in seabed mining research and explo-
ration is the Ocean Mining Associates (OMA) consortium. This
United States partnership was formed in 1974. That same year,
OMA's operating company, Deepsea Ventures, Inc., filed a claim
with the United States Department of State for a 60,000 square kil-
ometer area of the Pacific.7 1 In recent years, OMA has been the
most active of the commercial consortia, largely because of an infu-
sion of funds in late 1980 when ENI, the Italian national oil com-
pany, joined the group. Like mogt governmental efforts in this area,
the Italian government appears motivated primarily by an extra-eco-
nomic interest in long-run diversity of supply rather than the profit
potential of seabed metals sales.7 2 In addition to ENI's less-than-
quarter share,7 3 the consortium is held equally in greater-than-quar-
70. For a summary of the participation of seabed mining enterprises, see Appen-
dix I.
71. Deepsea Ventures, Inc.: Notice of Discovery and Claim of Executive Mining
Rights and Request for Diplomatic Protection and Protection of Investments, U.S. De-
partment of State, filed Nov. 15, 1974.
72. Bastianelli, Situazione e Prospettive del Mercato di Alcuni Metalli Non Fer-
rosi. Ruolo Strategico del 'Deep Sea Mining. Gli Interessi Italiani, 18 BOLLETFINO
DELLA ASSOCIAZIONE MINERARIA SUBALPINA 303-23 (1981); Bastianelli, IL Nuovo
DIRITTO DEL MARE E L'ITALIA (1982).
73. Under the terms of its entry into OMA, ENI paid a lump sum upon joining
and agreed to pay more than two-thirds of the group's expenses until its total outlay
equalled that of the other members. Upon reaching that point, each member would as-
sume a 25% share of expenses.
[VOL. 21: 541, 1984] Conflict Resolution
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
ter shares by Sun, a diversified United States energy company; U.S.
Steel, the largest United States steel producer and a major consumer
of manganese; and Union Miniere, a Belgium mining concern associ-
ated with Belgium's large Societe Generale, which holds a major po-
sition in the world cobalt market. The consortium's total expendi-
tures are estimated at more than $130 million.7 Most recently, the
group has concentrated efforts on transferring information to the
Italian partner and securing site claims and licenses. OMA has ap-
plied for a seabed exploration license area of 156,000 square kilome-
ters.7 5 Significantly, none of the OMA partners comes from a nation
that is a signatory to the 1982 Convention. Therefore, OMA cannot
qualify as a pioneer explorer under PIP requirements.7
The commercial group that comes closest to being a purely private
enterprise is the Ocean Minerals Company (OMCO), or the "Lock-
heed Group." This United States partnership consists of four compa-
nies from only two nations, the United States and the Netherlands.
The consortium was organized by Lockheed in 1977 as an outlet for
the company's high-technology deep seas operation capabilities. To-
day, the OMCO consortium also includes AMOCO Ocean Minerals
Company, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Standard Oil of Indiana,
holding about 31% ownership; Bos Kalis, a Dutch marine engineer-
ing concern, with less than 8%; and Billiton International Metals, a
Dutch subsidiary of Royal Dutch/Shell, with about 31%. As opera-
tor and prime contractor for the OMCO partnership, Lockheed is
earning immediate revenues from the group's activities, while the
other partners are making direct outlays for those activities.7 7 Ex-
penditures by the group, largely for the development of a sophisti-
cated remote-controlled mobile miner, are estimated at more than
74. 18 OCEAN INDUSTRY 49 (January 1983). Caution should be used in interpret-
ing these estimates. They include estimated expenditures made at different points in time
and apparently have not been adjusted for inflation. They are presented here only to
indicate the relative scale of expenditures that have been made, not as exact measures of
those investments. Because of their importance to questions of accrued equity interest in
claimed sites, exact accounts of actual company expenditures are very closely-held pro-
prietary information.
75. L.J. Aurbach, Office of Ocean Minerals and Energy, NOAA, personal commu-
nication, Feb. 8, 1984; 49 Fed. Reg. 4814 (1984). Area claim totals reflect adjustments
made under the Industry Arbitration Agreement.
76. See supra note 23.
77. A significant portion of Lockheed's share in the venture was, furthermore,
based on "in-kind" contribution of intangible capital acquired through earlier company
efforts on seabed mining techniques, partly through the company's involvement in the
Hughes' Glomar Explorer submarine recovery operation.
$120 million.78 Partly because the Netherlands is a signatory to the
1982 Convention while the United States is not, and partly because
of the souring economics of seabed mining, Billiton has announced
its withdrawal from OMCO, though legal implementation of this
withdrawal apparently is still underway.79 Similarly, Bos Kalis has
declined to contribute to OMCO activities since early 1981, prefer-
ring to let its share dilute.80 AMOCO's position toward further ac-
tivities in the group is still unknown, while Lockheed continues to
promote additional investment in marine mining.8 OMCO has ap-
plied to NOAA for a Seabed exploration license of 166,000 square
dlometers.82
The Kennecott Consortium (KCON) was formed as an unincorpo-
rated joint venture at the initiative of the Kennecott Copper Corpo-
ration in 1974. The consortium is composed of Kennecott, a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Standard Oil of Ohio, which is controlled by
British Petroleum (40%); British Petroleum itself (12%); Rio Tinto
Zinc (12%) and Consolidated Gold Fields (12%), two British mining
houses; Noranda (12%), a Canadian mining company; and Mitsub-
ishi (12%), a Japanese conglomerate.83 The consortium is managed
by Kennecott, but decisions on expenditures and program of work
are made by a full committee of members.84 If Kennecott's 40%
share is included as a British holding, rather than a United States
holding, the combined British share in the group is 76%. The re-
78. OCEAN INDUSTRY, supra note 74, at 49.
79. BILLITON INTERNATIONAL NEWSLETTER, supra note 4.
80. Private communications with company officials, supra note 4.
81. Id.
82. See supra note 75.
83. The consortium's ownership structure in recent years has been dominated in-
creasingly by British interests. The original members were Kennecott (50%), at that time
an independent United States copper corporation; Rio Tinto Zinc (20%); Consolidated
Gold Fields (10%); Noranda (10%); and Mitsubishi (10%). Formation of the group and
participation by British companies were aided in 1974 when the British government
made a loan to Rio Tinto Zinc and Consolidated Gold Fields of £ 830,000 under the
Science and Technology Act of 1965. Deep Sea Mining (Temporary Provisions) Bill
[Lords] 6, House of Commons, Special Standing Committee (First Sitting, May 19,
1981) [hereinafter cited as House of Commons]. Private discussions with company offi-
cials indicate that Mitsubishi's participation was assisted by the Japanese government.
See also GAO, supra note 4, at 16-19. In 1977, British Petroleum was brought into the
consortium through the purchase of half of Rio Tinto Zinc's share and the assumption of
half of Rio Tinto Zinc's government loan responsibility. House of Commons, supra, at
14. Throughout most of the postwar period, the British government has held about 50%
interest in British Petroleum, with reserved seats on the board of directors. More re-
cently, however, the government share in British Petroleum has fallen to about 40%.
British Petroleum acquired effective control over Kennecott when Standard Oil of Ohio,
already controlled by British Petroleum, bought Kennecott in 1981. Subsequent readjust-
ment in consortium shares reduced Kennecott's position to 40% and increased each of the
other members' shares to 12%.
84. Deep Sea Mining (Temporary Provisions) Bill [Lords] at 109, 128, House of
Commons, Special Standing Committee, (Third Sitting, June 4, 1981).
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maining 24% is split between the companies from Canada and Ja-
pan, which, unlike the British, are signatories to the 1982 Conven-
tion. KCON has applied to NOAA for a seabed exploration license
of 173,000 square kilometers."5 The Kennecott Group's members ap-
parently have been motivated by the prospect of eventual seabed
mining profits, rather than, as may have been the case in the Lock-
heed Group, by more immediate revenues from the sale of research
and development services.86 Most of the estimated $50 million spent
by the group was invested before 1976, when the consortium became
virtually inactive in exploration and technical development.87
The multinational development consortium, Ocean Management,
Inc. (OMI), was organized in 1975 by INCO (International Nickel
Company of Canada), which has been for many years the dominant
factor in the international nickel market.88 OMI is a United States
partnership,8 9 composed of the Canadian INCO (25%); SEDCO
(25%), a United States marine operator; Deep Ocean Minerals
Company (25%), a complex Japanese corporate joint venture of 24
companies led by the Sumitomo Corporation; and Arbeitsgemein-
schaft Meerestechnische Gewinnbare Rohstoffe (AMR)(25%), a
West German partnership shared by Metallgesellschaft, the largest
nonferrous metals company in Germany, Preussag, a major German
extractive resources company with extensive marine operations capa-
bilities, and Salzgitter, a State-owned diversified steel company with
interests in shipbuilding and marine operations. AMR was formed in
1974 with the active encouragement of the West German govern-
ment, including 50 to 100% governmental funding on a project-by-
project basis, and loans and grants from the West German Ministry
of Research and Technology." Activities of the Japanese group in
OMI also have been supported by loans from the Japanese
government.9 1
85. See supra note 75.
86. Private communications with company officials, supra note 4.
87. House of Commons, supra note 83, at 109.
88. INCO was a pioneer in studies of the economic potential of seabed manganese
nodules, beginning work in the late 1960s. INCO's involvement was initiated not out of
sincere belief that nodules could be commercially exploited, but rather to protect the
company's market position against the possibility of seabed competition. INCO, LTD,
1968 ANNUAL REPORT.
89. The OMI partnership is governed by a partnership committee with an annually
rotating chairmanship and managed by a United States corporation owned by the
partnership.
90. Fellerer, German Activities in the Field of Nodules, PROC. INTERNATIONAL
SEMINAR ON OFFSHORE MINERAL RESOURCES (Oct. 23-27, 1978) (Orleans, France).
91. Nakahara, Comparative Study on Deepsea Development Policies of Japan and
OMI successfully tested its technological concepts by recovering
large amounts of nodules in 1978. OMI has spent an estimated $50
million to $100 million on ocean mining research and development
and exploration. Nearly all the funds were invested before 1980,
when site-specific exploration activities were concluded.92 The con-
sortium's current activities are limited to securing exploration area
claims. OMI has applied to NOAA for a seabed exploration license
of 135,000 square kilometers.93 OMI apparently is suffering great
internal stress from a diversity of motivations and objectives among
the partners. The West German and Japanese groups respond to the
interests of their government sponsors in developing alternative
sources of long-run materials supply. INCO, on the other hand, in-
tends to protect the company's eroding position in the world nickel
market, while SEDCO seeks to diversify future demand for its
marine technology capabilities as well as earn profits directly from
metals production and marketing. The consortium's decision-making
sometimes is frustrated by the "rule of unanimity," which confers an
effective veto on each partner.94 Diplomatically, the group is split in
half, with Canada and Japan as signatories to the 1982 Convention
and treaty process, while the United States and West Germany have
declined to sign the Convention.
The French effort in seabed mining is almost entirely governmen-
tal, although two private companies are members of the French con-
sortium. The Association Francaise pour l'Etude et de la Recherche
des Nodules (AFERNOD) is a French syndicate formed in 1974.
The company's major partner and leading organization is the French
national agency for development and exploitation of ocean resources,
IFREMER (formerly Centre National pour l'Exploitation des
Oceans or CNEXO), which holds about 70% ownership. The next
major partner also is an agency of the French government, the ex-
tensive Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique (CEA), with about 20%
interest in the group. Both private partners--Societe Metallurgique
le Nickel, the major French nickel producer, and Chantiers du Nord
et la Mediterranee, a large shipbuilding concern of the Empain
Schneider conglomerate (formerly Chantiers de France-Dunker-
que)-have played relatively minor roles, each holding about 5%
the United States, (unpublished manuscript) (1982); private communications with com-
pany officials, supra note 4.
92. OCEAN INDUSTRY, supra note 74, at 49; private communications with company
officials, supra note 4.
93. See supra note 75.
94. Private communications with company officials, supra note 4. SEDCO, Inc.,
Agreement and Amendment to Joint Venture Agreement of February 20, 1975 and
Memorandum of Understanding Relating to Disposal by SEDCO of its Individual
Share of Products, FORM 10 K ANNUAL REPORT (1975) [hereinafter cited as Joint Ven-
ture Agreement].
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ownership. The group's expenditures are estimated at nearly $50
million, although little development or exploration activity has oc-
cured since 1979.15
In recent months a new, solely-governmental group consisting of
IFREMER and CEA has been formed to continue research and de-
velopment. The new group is a "Groupement d'Int6r&t Public" called
GEMONOD.96 AFERNOD will continue to exist formally, but the
consortium's activities will be limited to acquiring exploration and
mine site licenses. AFERNOD's original exploration area claim of
300,000 square kilometers has been modified under the Industry Ar-
bitration Agreement.9 The claim presumably has been reduced by
about 50%, in conformance with publicly filed claims of the private
consortia.98 France has signed the 1982 Convention and is actively
involved in the work of PrepCom. The nation is delaying ratification
of the Convention until PrepCom's work on the rules and regulations
of the ISA can be examined. 9
Although several Japanese companies, most notably Mitsubishi
and Sumitomo, are involved actively in international commercial
seabed mining consortia, the Japanese government also sponsors a
large domestic consortium. In fact, the Japanese government appears
consciously to have pursued a "dual policy" for seabed mining,
which combines the coordination of an exclusively national program
with the encouragement of Japanese company participation in inter-
national consortia.100 Within the national program, a complex and
95. OCEAN INDUSTRY, SUPRA note 74.
96. See generally MINISTERE DE L'INDUSTRIE ET DE LA RECHERCHE, LS GROUPE-
MENTS D'INTERET PUBLIC: GUIDE D'INFORNIATION (1983).
97. Private communications with company officials, supra note 4.
98. In early 1982, OMA, OMCO, KCON, and OMI filed exploration license ap-
plications with NOAA. KCON filed in the United Kingdom, and OMI filed in West
Germany (probably through AMR). During industry conflict resolution discussions under
the Industry Arbitration Agreement, the applied-for areas were reduced as follows:
OMA-from 290,600 to 156,000 square kilometers, a reduction of 46%; OMCO-from
299,881 to 166,000 square kilometers, a reduction of 45%; KCON-from 300,000 to
173,000 square kilometers, a reduction of 42%; and OMI-from 559,000 to 135,000
square kilometers, a reduction of 76%. Note, however, that AMR's West German appli-
cation reportedly totals 145,000 square kilometers. If this area is added to OMI's
amended application of 135,00 square kilometers, then the reduction from OMI's origi-
nal 559,000 square kilometers area becomes only 50%. 48 Fed. Reg. 50386-87 (1983); 49
Fed. Reg. 3108, 4813-14 (1984); Aurbach, supra note 75.
99. 24 OCEAN SCIENCE NEWS 2 (Dec. 20, 1982); see also Unique Ceremony
Marks End to Long Sea Law Conference," 20 UN MONTHLY CHRON. 3, 7 (February
1983).
100. Koga, Developing a Manganese Nodule Policy for Japan, in OCEAN POLICY
OF JAPAN (1982); Draft, Institute for Marine and Coastal Studies, University of South-
ern California; see also Nakahara, supra note 91.
intimate relationship between the government and participating pri-
vate companies sometimes blurs the distinction between the two
groups. All Japanese companies that are members of international
consortia also are participants in the national program. The national
effort is focused through a joint government-industry firm, Deep
Ocean Resources Development Co., Ltd. (DORD), formed in 1982
to promote nodule exploration and mining. DORD is financed
largely by the government with some contribution by about 50 pri-
vate companies, including the nearly 40 members of Deep Ocean
Minerals Association (DOMA). Prior to DORD'S formation,
DOMA was the primary organ linking Japanese national and private
seabed mining exploration and development efforts.10'
After the passage of Japanese domestic seabed mining legislation
in 1982, DORD applied for a license for an exploration area south of
Hawaii of roughly 336,000 to 575,000 square kilometers.0 2 An ex-
press purpose of DORD was to act as a Japanese delegate in inter-
national discussions for the division of prospective seabed mining ar-
eas.103 Japan is a signatory to the 1982 Convention, and in February
1982, the Japanese government officially announced its intentions
not to participate in a "mini-treaty." 'o Nevertheless, in December
1983, DORD reached agreement with other enterprises under the
Industry Arbitration Agreement. 05 Assuming DORD's original area
claim was reduced by about 50%, the revised claim would be
168,000 to 287,500 square kilometers. 0 6 Since 1981, the Japanese
government has designated the development of a manganese nodule
mining system as one of eight national "Large Scale Projects," with
a projected 1981-89 budget of about $86 million. 07
State Enterprises
In addition to the major mixed-form commercial efforts, several
solely governmental research and development programs exist. Most
of the programs are relatively new and have not been mounted on
the same financial scale as the commercial consortia. Moreover, the
101. The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry established
DOMA as a technical promotion group in 1974.
102. Nakahara, supra note 91; Nakahara, Recent Activities for Deepsea Manga-
nese Nodule Development, 13 KAIYo SANGYO KENKYU SHIRO (1982) (Research Insti-
tute for Ocean Economics, Tokyo); Aurbach, supra note 75.
103. To further that purpose, the Resource Survey Division of DOMA was reas-
signed to DORD in 1982.
104. Nakahara, supra note 91.
105. L.J. Aurbach, Office of Ocean Minerals and Energy, NOAA, personal com-
munication (Sept. 16, 1983).
106. See supra note 98.
107. MANGANESE NODULE MINING SYSTEM, COMM. FOR COORDINATION OF JOINT
PROSPECTING FOR MINERAL RESOURCES IN ASIAN OFFSHORE AREAS, (Note for Provi-
sional Agenda Item-TAG.5.1) (Nov. 27, 1982).
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governmental programs appear motivated more by an interest in al-
ternative sources of long-run materials supply than by prospects for
commercially-generated profits from the production and sale of
metals.
Perhaps the most politically aggressive governmental seabed min-
ing pioneer is the Soviet Union. Little is publicly known about the
nature of the Soviet seabed mining program. The Soviets began sci-
entific exploration for seabed nodules in the early 1960s, most nota-
bly with the research vessel Vitjaz.1°8 Since 1977, Soviet agencies
have been prospecting in various areas, including the Clarion and
Clipperton fracture zones of the Pacific where commercial consortia
efforts are concentrated, and have been developing exploration and
recovery technoogy.10 9 As early as 1974, in fact, the Soviets were
prospecting with a specialized ship, the Illmenit.110 As a signatory to
the 1982 Convention, the Soviet Union been actively involved in the
activities of PrepCom. Indeed, the Soviets have adopted a confronta-
tional posture that has complicated the conffict resolution proceed-
ings of PrepCom.11
India appears to be the first developing nation to carry out a suc-
cessful oceanographic program dedicated to manganese nodule ex-
ploration." 2 Nodules are known to exist in the central Indian
Ocean,118 and the Indians have focused their prospecting program on
that area. The Indian Council of Scientific and Industrial Research
and other Indian agencies give high priority to the development of
technology for nodule mining, recovery, and beneficiation under a
program called the "All India Coordinated Project," supervised by
the government's Department of Ocean Development.1 4 In addition
to the cost of ships, India reports that the government has invested
"several million" dollars in exploration and resource assessment in
the Indian Ocean. 15
South Korea also has launched a national program for seabed
108. P.L. Bezrukov, Manganese Nodules of the Pacific Ocean, in TIKHIJ OKEAN
(Pacific Ocean), Moscow: Izd. Nauka (Science Press), 203-68 (1970).
109. DEP'T OF INT'L ECON. AND Soc. AFF., UNITED NATIONS, SEA-BED MINERAL
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 9 (1982).
110. R.M. Linebaugh, Ocean Mining in the Soviet Union, 14 MARINE TECHNOL-
OGY SOCIETY J. 21 (1982).
111. See infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
112. United Nations, supra note 109, at 10.
113. D.S. Cronan and S.A. Moorby, Ore Grade Manganese Nodules from the
Central Indian Ocean, PROC. OCEANOLOGY INT'L (1982) (Brighton, England).
114. United Nations, supra note 109.
115. Id.
mining exploration and development. The government announced
that $30 million will be invested by the end of 1984. Similar to the
Soviet program, little is publicly known about the Korean effort, ex-
cept that the program apparently is supervised by the Korean Ocean
Research and Development Institute. The extent to which the pro-
gram will be organized as a State operation, private enterprise, or
mixed-form remains to be seen.
China has conducted a manganese nodule research and develop-
ment program since 1976, and has successfully recovered nodules in
1978 and 1979. Chinese exploration has occured in various areas of
the Pacific Ocean, including an "area of the central Pacific near the
Equator."11 The Chinese government's investment in these activities
is reported as more than 80 million yuan,1 17 of which more than 16
million yuan has gone directly to surveying activity.1 8 The govern-
ment's work reportedly has been limited to basic scientific investiga-
tions under the general supervision and policy direction of the Na-
tional Bureau of Oceanography. China is a signatory to the 1982
Convention and participates in PrepCom.
National Governments
In addition to their roles in seabed mining enterprises, national
governments are central actors in the assignment of quasi-property
rights for seabed mining sites. The governments' role primarily in-
volves: (1) negotiating and adopting international agreements secur-
ing seabed mining rights; 1 9 (2) directing, regulating, or conditioning
the activities of seabed mining enterprises or organizations operating
under the governments' jurisdictions; and (3) certifying such enter-
prises or organizations for the purposes of PIP. 20
Area entitlements granted to international consortia under either
track are held by the consortia and their members, not by sponsoring
governments. Still, the governments have an interest in the size of
area entitlements conveyed to their nationals. Sponsoring govern-
ments have promoted development of seabed mining to acquire na-
tional access to alternative supply sources. In fact, the British gov-
ernment, as a condition of its 1974 loan, requires that British
members of KCON make their share of that group's output availa-
ble to British customers on a preferred basis. 21 Governments also
116. Id.
117. In United States currency, 80 million yuan is roughly $40 million.
118. United Nations, supra note 109, at 11.
119. Most States have negotiated and adopted either the 1982 Convention and its
PIP provisions securing seabed mining rights, or interim international agreements. For a
summary of the participation of seabed mining States in conflict resolution, see Appendix
II.
120. See supra note 23.
121. House of Commons, supra note 84, at 137.
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have assisted with and facilitated private company arrangements to
resolve conflicts and allocate areas among themselves. Therefore, ex-
amining the pro-rated size of areas claimed by nationals from each
country is interesting, although potentially misleading.
The United States has refrained from any direct financial involve-
ment in commercial seabed mining development but nonetheless has
been active as an interested government. Three of the major interna-
tional commercial consortia--OMCO, OMI, and OMA-operate as
United States business entities. In addition, United States companies
hold substantial interests in four consortia, with pro-rated totals of
"amended" area claims between 283,870 and 214,670 square kilo-
meters. 122 Consortia activities have qualified the United States en-
terprises as pioneer investors under PIP, but the United States can-
not "certify" them for that status without signing the 1982
Convention. 123 The United States, as an originator of the Interim
Agreement, has promoted the establishment of a reciprocating mini-
treaty outside the 1982 Convention framework.
In early 1982, NOAA accepted ten license applications from the
four United States consortia for "original" exploration areas total-
ling nearly 1,500,000 square kilometers. According to widespread re-
ports within the industry, "substantial" area overlaps existed among
the original domestic applications. Amendments by industry agree-
ment to resolve the conflicts reduced the total exploration areas by
roughly 50%.121
Although the United Kingdom has not signed the 1982 Conven-
tion, the government is attending PrepCom meetings as an ob-
server. 125 The United Kingdom also is a party to the Interim Agree-
ment. 126 The Kennecott Group has applied under British law for two
licenses covering 173,000 square kilometers. 127 Area claims of Brit-
122. The total United States' claims area varies depending on whether Kennecott's
69,200 square kilometer share of KCON's 173,000 square Kilometer claim is viewed as
belonging to the United States or the United Kingdom. See supra text following note 84.
123. The United States also has refused to participate as an observer at PrepCom
meetings and to finance the commission.
124. See supra note 98.
125. States that signed the Final Act were permitted to participate in PrepCom as
observers. Final Act, supra note 9, Annex I, Resolution I, para. 2.
126. The United Kingdom enacted domestic seabed mining legislation on July 20,
1981. See supra note 35.
127. The British government owns about 40% of British Petroleum which controls,
directly or indirectly, 52% of the KCON consortium. Another 24% of KCON is divided
between the British companies of Consolidated Gold Fields and Rio Tinto Zinc, giving
British companies a total share of 76% in KCON (if Kennecott is viewed as a British
company). The Royal Dutch/Shell Group's Billiton subsidiary, with its approximately
ish companies, after industry negotiations, total 62,280 or 131,480
square kilometers, depending on whether Kennecott is considered a
United States or British company.
The Federal Republic of Germany similarly has refused to sign
the 1982 Convention, but is a party to the Interim Agreement. OMI
originally filed for a 559,000 square kilometer exploration area
under West German seabed mining legislation. 128 The West German
share of the area claim through AMR's participation in the OMI
consortium, as amended through industry negotiations, is 33,750
square kilometers. In addition, AMR reportedly has filed a license
application in West Germany of about 145,000 square kilometers,
which is independent of the OMI application. 129 West Germany has
supported industry involvement in seabed mining activities appar-
ently because of concern for the long-run strategic importance of
seabed metal supplies. The government has a direct interest in the
seabed mining industry through its ownership of Salzgitter, a partner
of AMR, and through its financial support of industry activities.
France is another major seabed mining nation that qualifies as a
pioneer investor under PIP. With typically Gallic diplomatic verve,
the French are party to the Interim Agreement,' 0 as well as active
participants in the PrepCom proceedings. Like West Germany,
31% share in OMCO, is also partially British-owned but, as previously mentioned, Billi-
ton is withdrawing from further participation. See supra text accompanying notes 78 and
81.
128. See supra note 35.
129. See supra note 98. OMI is the only consortium in which West German com-
panies participate. A 25% stake in OMI is shared equally through AMR by Salzgitter,
Metallgesellschaft, and Preussag. Industry reports suggest that, to some extent at least,
AMR has been acting in recent years as an independent national consortium on its own
account. The extent to which AMR is permitted to do this under terms of the Joint
Venture Agreement with the other OMI participants is unclear. Article II(2.2)(b) of the
Joint Venture Agreement states that, subject to certain qualifications, "[d]uring the pe-
riod of this agreement, no Participant, nor any of its Affiliates shall engage outside the
Project in activities directly related to the field of ocean mining of Manganese Nodules
so long as such Party remains a participant hereunder. . . ." However, this article con-
tinues to state specifically that ". . . any Participant or Affiliate may engage in any such
activity outside the project as a party in a project or projects sponsored or promoted by
any government or any governmental agency or governmental corporation of the country
under whose laws the Participant or Affiliate concerned has been organized or incorpo-
rated or with the written consent of all other participants entitled to vote. . . ." Joint
Venture Agreement, supra note 94, at 4. A Memorandum of Understanding, of February
28, 1975, further clarifies the Joint Venture Agreement: "The Participants ... recog-
nize and acknowledge that in any such multinational undertaking the present and future
relationships and obligations of each Participant and its Affiliates to its national govern-
ment will be observed and satisfied so far as is possible... so as not to confer on others
not a party to the said Agreement the benefits or proprietary rights which accrue to each
of the participants as parties to the Agreement." Id. at para. 1. Independent AMR activ-
ity apparently must be justified as state required action or consented to by the other
members.
130. France enacted domestic seabed mining legislation on December 23, 1982. See
supra note 35.
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France takes a long-term strategic view of the value of a seabed min-
ing stake. Consistent with this attitude, the French effort appears to
be cognizant of and responsive to the activities of other nations.
France has a two-prong domestic mining program, with the mixed-
form AFERNOD and, more recently, with the governmental enter-
prise GEMONOD. Unlike the Japanese, France has no involvement
in international or multinational commercial seabed mining enter-
prises. After private discussions under the Industry Arbitration
Agreement, France's original 300,000 square kilometer claim pre-
sumably was reduced to about 150,000 square kilometers. 131
Japan's complex involvement in seabed mining already has been
described.1 32 Mitsubishi holds a 12% share in KCON, and the
Sumitomo-led DOMCO group holds 25% of OMI. In addition, the
domestic Japanese effort coordinated through DORD has moved
ahead with an ambitious investment program. The publicly-an-
nounced Japanese area claims total roughly 336,000 to 575,000
square kilometers but undoubtedly have been reduced to accommo-
date DORD's participation under the Industry Arbitration Agree-
ment.133 As a populous, resource-poor, industrial economy, Japan is
motivated by the prospects of diversified materials supply through
seabed mining development. Japan especially is interested in main-
taining friendly relations with less developed supplier nations be-
cause of similar national characteristics.
Japan has signed the 1982 Convention and has been a participant
in PrepCom. Japan enacted domestic seabed mining legislation on
July 20, 1982, but is not a party to the Interim Agreement.3 4 Nev-
ertheless, the Japanese have been involved in international discus-
sions concerning the Interim Agreement and the private Industry
Arbitration Agreement.13 5
Italy thus far has declined to sign the 1982 Convention. Although
not a party to the Interim Agreement, Italy has been involved in
discussions concerning the agreement because of the nearly 25%
share ENI holds in OMA. Indeed, the "hurry-and-spend to-catch-
up" role that the Italians have played in OMA is motivated, in part
at least, by an effort to qualify under the terms of the Interim
Agreement or PIP. The government is interested in seabed mining
131. See supra note 98.
132. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 98.
134. See supra note 35.
135. Nakahara, supra note 91.
because of national strategic mineral supply considerations.3 6 Italy's
total area claim-its share of the OMA claim-is 39,000 square
kilometers. 137
Belgium also has not signed the 1982 Convention and is not a
party to the Interim Agreement. But, like Italy, the government is
participating in negotiations and discussions under the agreement be-
cause of Union Miniere's more than 25% share of OMA. The Bel-
gian share of the OMA claim is 39,000 square kilometers. 3 8 In ad-
dition, Belgium is attending PrepCom proceedings as an observer.
Canada has a major stake in seabed mining, not only because of
INCO's 25% share of OMI and Noranda's 12% of KCON, but also
because Canada is a major world nickel producer and a principal
beneficiary of the 1982 Convention. The Canadian share of KCON
and OMI area claims totals 54,510 square kilometers. 3 9 Canada has
signed the 1982 Convention and has played an active role in the con-
flict resolution activities of PrepCom. Although Canada is not a
party to the Interim Agreement, the Canadian government may be
involved in international discussions related to the Interim
Agreement.140
The Netherlands has an interest in seabed mining because of the
nearly 40% share of OMCO held by two Dutch Companies, Billiton
and Bos Kalis. Billiton, however, is withdrawing from the consor-
tium, and Bos Kalis has discontinued active participation with its
share diluting if other partners continue to invest. Pending those
changes the Dutch share of OMCO's claim totals 63,080 square ki-
lometers:' 4' The Netherlands has signed the 1982 Convention and is
a participant in PrepCom. While not a party to the Interim Agree-
ment, the Dutch government may have become involved to some ex-
tent in related international discussions. 4"
India has sponsored a domestic seabed mining program that has
concentrated on the nodule resources of the Indian Ocean. The In-
dian government has signed the 1982 Convention and has played an
active role in PrepCom, but has not been involved in the Interim
Agreement or associated discussions. Although India's area claim
has not been publicly announced, the government has stated that its
136. Bastianelli, supra note 72, at 316.
137. See supra note 98.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Two Canadian companies, INCO and Noranda, are members of international
consortia that have been involved in the Industry Abritration Agreement. Because indus-
try agreement may facilitate conflict resolution under the mini-treaty track, Canada may
have been involved in international discussions related to that track. Canada has main-
tained its position, however, in support of conflict resolution under PIP.
141. See supra note 98.
142. L.J. Aurbach, Office of Ocean Minerals and Energy, NOAA, personal com-
munication, (May 5, 1983).
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interest is restricted to the Indian Ocean and does not conflict with
the Soviet Union's claim in that area.143
The size of the Soviet Union's claim is not publicly known, but the
government agrees that no conflict exists with India's claim.144 The
Soviet Union sponsors a national seabed mining program, 141 but is
not a party to the Interim Agreement and was involved only in the
early stages of related international discussions.
The Soviets have signed the 1982 Convention and have pursued an
aggressively independent and impatient policy at the PrepCom delib-
erations. At PrepCom, the Soviets have noted the "absence" of "any
provisions concerning reciprocal obligations of certifying states re-
garding the exchange of coordinates" in PIP and have argued that
this absence prevents negotiations on conflict resolution.148 The gov-
ernment announced its intention to register as thefirst pioneer inves-
tor on May 1, 1983 if PrepCom does not receive notice from pro-
spective certifying States of a readiness to exchange coordinates and
resolve conflicts. 147 Several prospective certifying States argued that
the Soviet's position is premature since PrepCom has not begun to
function.1 48 Nonetheless, the Soviets reportedly have delivered an ap-
plication to the United Nations Secretariat in a sealed envelope. 149
Whether the Soviet application contains geographical coordinates is
unknown. 150
China sponsors national research, exploration, and development
toward seabed mining, but is not involved with the Interim Agree-
ment. The government is a signatory to the 1982 Convention and
participates in PrepCom. The Chinese have not yet sought claim to a
143. India, Note Verbale to PrepCom (May 13, 1983) (LOS/PCN/21).
144. Soviet Union, Letter to PrepCom (May 4, 1983) (LOS/PCN/19).
145. The Soviet Union enacted domestic seabed mining legislation on April 17,
1982. See supra note 35.
146. Soviet Union, Letter to PrepCom (April 6, 1983) (LOS/PCN/4).
147. Id.
148. France, Letter to PrepCom (April 27, 1983) (LOS/PCN/8); Japan, Letter to
PrepCom (April 28, 1983) (LOS/PCN/11); Canada, supra note 34.
149. The envelope was forwarded to the chairman of PrepCom, who returned it to
the United Nations Secretary General asking that it be kept safely and unopened until
PrepCom begins to receive area applications. The chairman acknowledged receipt of the
Soviet package. M.L. Pal, United Nations, Ocean Economics and Technology Branch,
personal communication (1983); see also United Nations, Department of Public Infor-
mation, Preparatory Commission for Sea-Bed Authority and Tribunal for Law of the Sea
Concludes Resumed First Session in Kingston, Jamaica, Press Release (Sept 12, 1983)
(SEA/523) (outlining registration guidelines for pioneer investors).
150. Commercial consortia speculate that the Soviet letter defines the Soviet claim
geographically and that the claim overlaps areas sought by three consortia. Private com-
munications with company officials, supra note 4.
seabed exploration and mine site but have described exploration and
development activities 151 and may have an interest in qualifying for
a site under the Convention's PIP provisions.
South Korea has initiated an accelerated national seabed mining
effort.152 The government has signed the 1982 Convention and has
participated in PrepCom proceedings. To date, the South Koreans
have not sought exclusive entitlement to any specific area for explo-
ration and development of seabed mining.
Other countries that have shown an interest in conflict resolution
through their activities at PrepCom and that may conceivably at-
tempt to qualify as pioneers under PIP include Australia, Egypt,
Finland, Indonesia, Kuwait, Norway, Pacific archipelagic States,
Sweden, and Spain. Norwegian companies have been employed as
contractors by the international consortia. In addition, the Norwe-
gian government has sponsored research and development activities
through the "Deep Ocean Nodule Mining Project," apparently to
explore the potential of Norwegian enterprise as a supplier to the
seabed mining industry.153 None of the other countries has any di-
rect involvement in seabed mining development or exploration, and
none has staked a claim to any prospective mine sites.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN DIVERGENCE OR CONVERGENCE OF
REGIMES
Several difficulties arise with conflict resolution procedures under
different regimes. Resolution of conflicts under either regime does
not remedy the problem of conflicts arising between regimes. The
regime under which seabed mining eventually will proceed may be
partially determined by the ability to resolve conflicts more rapidly
under one alternative than the other."" Nevertheless, any resolution
of conflicts, regardless of the track on which it occurs, represents
some progress toward overall resolution for both tracks.
Successful conflict resolution would move either regime closer to
functioning as a regulatory mechanism. This movement would create
the potential for greater divergence between regimes, particularly
since both regimes restrict cross-participation. For example, enact-
ment of domestic seabed mining legislation is required for a State to
enter into a reciprocating "mini-treaty" regime. This requirement
151. United Nations, supra note 109.
152. Bong Chool Suk, Geological Oceanography Lab., Korean Ocean Development
Institute, Seool, Lorea, personal communication (Apr. 4, 1984).
153. Marjoram, Nodules and Scandanavia-Mining Opportunities, 3 MARINE
POLICY 313-15 (1979).
154. Of course, in evaluating the relative advantages of one regime over another, a
seabed mining enterprise must look past the required conflict resolution process and con-
sider other factors, such as regime stability and financial costs incurred.
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precludes participation by a country with no domestic seabed mining
law, like Canada. On the other hand, the "Canadian" MOU clearly
intended to resolve overlapping pioneer area claims among prospec-
tive certifying States under PIP. Although some nonsignatory States
apparently were involved in early MOU discussions, the discussions
were stalled in part because of Soviet disapproval of participation by
nonsignatories. 155 Three out of four parties to the Interim Agreement
have not signed the 1982 Convention. France, the only signatory to
both the Convention and the Interim Agreement, may compromise
its 1982 Convention position (even before ratification) if the govern-
ment supports a United States-backed reciprocating States or mini-
treaty regime.156
Suppose the United States and other prospective reciprocating
States conclude a mini-treaty and their nationals claim exploration
areas between the nodule-rich Clarion and Clipperton fracture zones.
Imagine that the Soviet Union and other 1982 Convention signato-
ries register claims for pioneer areas under the PIP regime at the
same time and in the same region of the Pacific seabed. Overlaps
between exploration and pioneer area claims probably would result.
Conflicts are inevitable under two concurrently operating regimes,
and uncertainties exist as to whether one regime can be preferred
over the other in an international legal sense.157 Since no mechanism
exists to resolve conflicts between opposing seabed mining regimes,
155. See supra note 34.
156. Ratiner, The Law of the Sea: A Crossroads for American Foreign Policy, 60
FOR. AFF. 1006, 1017, n.3 (1982); see also 1982 Convention, supra note 1, art. 137,
para. 3. By not officially recognizing area claims of nonsignatory States and merely
agreeing not to issue licenses that conflict with or overlap claims of those States, France
might be able to join a mini-treaty and not be in violation of article 137, paragraph 3.
157. The emergence of a mini-treaty regime to challenge a recognized, but not yet
effective, PIP regime certainly will be questioned. Singapore's Ambassador T.B. Koh,
President of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, has threatened
to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of
mining the seabed outside the 1982 Convention. One commentator notes, however, that
principles of majority rule or priority in time are nonexistent in international law.
D'Amato, An Alternative to the Law of the Sea Convention, 77 A.J.I.L. 281, 283
(1983). The Commentator implies that the 1982 Convention's predominance is not guar-
anteed by having more signatories or concluding earlier than a mini-treaty. In fact,
D'Amato suggests that actual mining practice under one of the two regimes, which ex-
hibits the implementation of one treaty before the other, may be the determinant in any
evaluation of regime predominance. Id. at 284. Some commentators believe that the 1982
Convention regime is more stable than a mini-treaty regime because of its greater inter-
national acceptance and the difficulty of modifying embodied rules. Ratiner, supra note
59. Others believe that the Convention's ponderous provisions outweigh any perceived
stability. In any event, neither regime has established a track record to prove legal or
economic viability, so political considerations prevail.
the consequence is confrontation, or at least and much more likely, a
stalemate for seabed mining.158
The above scenario is not entirely fantastic. With none of OMA's
parent governments signatory to the 1982 Convention and therefore
unable to "certify" the group as a pioneer under PIP, the OMA con-
sortium is effectively locked-out of PrepCom conflict resolution. If
the Soviet Union had knowledge of the OMA area claim coordi-
nates, the government could take advantage of OMA's years of work
in locating a promising site by applying to PrepCom for the identical
area claim under PIP.159 This would confer on the Soviets a low-cost
public relations benefit by permitting them to assume the role of
"enforcer" of the 1982 Convention against the "outlaw" claims of
the United States partnership. The Soviet's efforts may be frus-
trated, however, by conflict resolution agreements under the private
Industry Arbitration Agreement. OMA and the other consortia have
privately agreed to exchange portions of previously claimed areas, so
the original OMA site will have become part of the applications of
others. A Soviet effort to claim-jump OMA through PIP, therefore,
would involve the Soviets in conflicts with other groups that are rep-
resented in PrepCom and are prospectively PIP pioneers.
Such cross-track conflicts, however, may increase convergence by
identifying means for inter-track resolution, and thus increase inte-
gration. The two regimes are not dissimilar and, if not for the "alter-
native" flavor of the reciprocating mini-treaty process, could be
viewed as complementary. Both call for voluntary resolution of con-
flicts, followed by binding arbitration if voluntary resolution fails.160
The factors used by both regimes to determine area claim priorities
under binding arbitration are virtually identical.' After area claim
overlaps have been resolved, both regimes impose similar "due dili-
gence" requirements on pre-enactment explorers or pioneers. 162 In
addition, both regimes exact financial payments from seabed miners,
158. See generally Antrim and Sebenius, Incentives for Ocean Mining Under the
Convention, in LAW OF THE SEA: U.S. POLICY DILEMMA, 79-99 (Oxman, Caron and
Buderi eds. 1983). The authors note, however, that from the perspective of the 1982
Convention signatories, "the problems of site conflict with nontreaty miners may be re-
duced through agreement outside of official channels." Id. at 97.
159. Industry observers believe that the Soviets could have a good idea of OMA's
site coordinates through satellite observations of at-sea work and through Deepsea Ven-
ture's 1974 announcement of its preferred mining site. See supra note 71.
160. See Interim Agreement, supra note 55; 15 C.F.R. 970.201 -970.208 (1982);
Final Act, supra note 9.
161. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 30 and 58.
162. During exploration, DSHMRA requires licensees to incur "periodic reasona-
ble expenditures" as determined by NOAA. 30 U.S.C. 1418(b) (Supp. V) (1981). Under
PIP, pioneer investors "shall agree to incur periodic expenditures" as determined by
PrepCom. Final Act, supra note 9, at Annex I, Resolution II, para. 7(c). Of course,
NOAA and PrepCom may not decide upon the same definition for "periodic
expenditures."
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although these payments differ under each regime.16 3
The Interim Agreement between France, West Germany, the
United Kingdom, and the United States recognizes the interim (not
alternative) nature of domestic seabed mining laws and clearly con-
templates the resolution of conflicts among pioneers pending the en-
try into force of the 1982 Convention.16 4 The harmonization of do-
mestic seabed mining laws envisioned by a reciprocating States
agreement seems advantageous to normalize seabed mining regula-
tion and, at the same time, resolve exploration area conflicts under
the PIP regime. France and Japan are active participants in both
tracks, and The Netherlands and Belgium bridge both regimes to a
lesser extent.
Conflict resolution by seabed mining enterprises under the Indus-
try Arbitration Agreement could serve the purpose of PIP, but only
if private agreement is reached before PrepCom begins to accept
PIP applications. PrepCom has been progressing slowly, so that con-
flict resolution outside of PrepCom can be expected to contribute to
the conflict resolution specified by PIP.16 5 Furthermore, the 1982
Convention may be joined by States not yet parties. The inception of
seabed mining economically is projected far into the future so that
many years will be available for resolution of conflicts without con-
cerns over actual operational claim-jumping. The prospects are
favorable that conflict resolution activities eventually will contribute
to a convergence of tracks rather than a divergence.
CONCLUSION
The conflict resolution process is crucial to the inception of seabed
mining. Without the resolution of area claim overlaps, seabed mining
enterprises will not have the security of tenure necessary to prevent
claim-jumping and to make major mining investments. Hence, the
timing of salient events in the development and execution of the con-
flict resolution processes have set the pace of seabed mining since
1980.
Efforts by seabed mining enterprises to obtain entitlement to ex-
clusivity of activity within preferred sites on the international sea
163. Antrim & Sebenius, supra note 158, at 86-89. The tax under DSHMRA dis-
appears when an international deep seabed mining treaty takes effect with respect to the
United States, or after June 28, 1990, whichever occurs first. 26 U.S.C. § 4498(a) (Supp.
V) (1981).
164. Id.
165. Because of some States' involvement in both processes, the pace of PrepCom
may be controlled somewhat to permit this result.
floor have been channeled into two more or less competing tracks.
One track leads to a regime under the 1982 Convention and requires
compliance with conditions necessary for qualification as a "pioneer"
under PIP. The other track involves qualification as a "pre-enact-
ment explorer" under domestic legislation, along with reciprocal ar-
rangements on a multinational basis. The second track could lead to
an alternative "mini-treaty" for seabed mining regulation. On both
tracks, conflict resolution procedures have been devised to eliminate
geographical area overlaps before the assignment of entitlements.
The tracks' conflict resolution procedures are similar, and success-
ful resolution in either track could facilitate progress in the other.
Some parties, most notably Japan and France, are engaged in both
efforts and could form a bridge between the two regimes. Indeed, the
arrangements developed through efforts in the separate tracks could
contribute eventually to a convergence of the two regulatory regimes.
Because of the novelty of institutions and regulations for the inter-
national organization and governance of seabed mining activities, ef-
forts to resolve conflicting claims have required imaginative arrange-
ments and innovations in multilateral relationships. The mixed-form
character of the embryonic seabed mining industry also has necessi-
tated creative conflict management. Altogether, the attempts at con-
flict resolution have been an international learning experience and
have helped to pave the way to greater global economic integration.
Such attempts may not move the world closer to a "new interna-
tional economic order," but they represent an exercise in the creation
of new organizational mechanisms for the increasingly mixed-form
world economy that is responsive to political will and the economic
exigencies of commercial reality.
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